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In Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Minister of Labour (2013 (1) 
BLLR 105 (GNP); 2013 (1) All SA 688 (GNP)) the Law Society of the 
Northern Provinces applied to the North Gauteng High Court for an order 
declaring rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings before 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (GG 25515 of 10 
October 2003) (Rules) unconstitutional. The application was opposed by the 
Minister of Labour, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and the 
Director of the CCMA. 
 
2 Statutory  framework 
 
Section 115(2A)(k) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) provides 
that the CCMA may make rules regulating the right of any person or 
category of persons to represent any party in any conciliation or arbitration 
proceedings. To this end, rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules provides as follows: 
 
“25. Representation before the Commission 
(1) … 
(b) In any arbitration proceedings, a party to the dispute may appear 
in person or be represented only by: 
(1) a legal practitioner; 
(2) a director or employee of that party and if a close corporation 
also a member thereof; or 
(3) any member, office bearer or official of that party’s registered 
trade union or registered employer’s organisation.  
(c) If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a dismissal 
and a party has alleged that the reason for the dismissal relates to 
the employee’s conduct or capacity, the parties, despite subrule 
(1) (b), are not entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in 
the proceedings unless – 
(1) the commissioner and all the other parties consent; 
(2) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect 
a party to deal with the dispute without legal representation, 
after considering – 
(a) the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; 
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(b) the complexity of the dispute; 
(c) the public interest; and 
(d) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their 




In the Law Society of the Northern Provinces case (supra), Tuchten J first 
had to determine whether the Law Society had the requisite standing to 
bring the application. The Law Society submitted that it had locus standi to 
bring the application on the basis that its membership comprises every 
attorney, notary and conveyancer in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and 
portions of the North West Province. The Law Society further submitted that 
it is empowered by statute and the common law to “[m]aintain and enhance 
the status of the profession, generally to represent its members and to deal 
with and protect all matters touching upon the interests of the profession” 
(par 5). 
    The Law Society’s standing was disputed in the Respondents’ answering 
affidavit, but they failed to address the court on this issue in argument. 
Consequently, the case proceeded without the need for the court to decide 
the issue. Tuchten J, relying on the judgment of National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs (2000 (2) SA 1 (CC)), 
remarked that the Law Society “[m]ay properly rely on the objective 
unconstitutionality of the measure for the relief sought even though the right 
unconstitutionally infringed is not that of the Law Society but of some other 
person …” and that the Respondents’ decision not to challenge the locus 
standi of the Law Society was “[a] wise one” (par 6). 
 
4 The CCMA, Commissioners and the dispute-
resolution  process  generally 
 
After having disposed of the Respondents’ submission that the Law Society 
lacked the requisite locus standi to bring the application, Tuchten J 
proceeded to explain that the CCMA is a statutory body, established under 
section 112 of the LRA, and had as its primary function the resolution of 
disputes referred to it in terms of the LRA. Tuchten J also defined the role of 
commissioners of the CCMA as having been tasked with the responsibility of 
giving effect to the primary function of the CCMA, that was, to attempt to 
resolve disputes referred to it in terms of the LRA. He also provided a brief 
overview of the dispute-resolution process as envisaged in the LRA. In this 
regard, the dispute-resolution process entailed the conduct of compulsory 
conciliation proceedings which, if it did not result in the settlement of the 
dispute, was followed by the conduct of arbitration proceedings. At 
arbitration proceedings, commissioners are afforded a wide array of powers, 
including conducting the arbitration in a manner that the commissioner 
considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly and 
dealing with the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal 
formalities. 




5 Administrative  action 
 
Tuchten J, referring to inter alia the cases of Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines (2008 (2) SA 24 (CC)) and Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula 
Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee (2002 (5) SA 449 (SCA)), 
confirmed that an arbitration tribunal constituted under the auspices of the 
LRA was not a court of law and that a commissioner conducting an 
arbitration under the auspices of the CCMA was essentially performing an 
administrative function. According to Tuchten J, this is an important 
observation as there was no general entitlement to legal representation in 
dispute resolution forums other than courts of law. It was, therefore, held that 
the LRA, which authorized administrative action, had to be read together 
with the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) unless the 
provisions of the authorizing statute were inconsistent with PAJA in which 
case the provisions of the authorizing statute would prevail. In this regard, 
Tuchten J stated as follows: 
 
“An arbitration tribunal constituted under the LRA is not a court. A 
commissioner conducting a CCMA arbitration is performing an administrative 
function. This is important because, as the law stands, there is no general 
entitlement to legal representation in arenas in which disputes are resolved 
except in courts. However, under s 3(3)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’), administrators as that term is used in PAJA, 
including presiding officers in administrative tribunals, must consider on a 
case by case basis whether a person whose rights or legitimate expectations 
are (I would add: potentially) materially and adversely affected by 
administrative action should be given an opportunity to obtain legal 
representation. Statutes such as the LRA, which authorise administrative 
action, must be read together with PAJA unless, on a proper construction, the 
provisions of the authorising statute are inconsistent with PAJA” (par 15). 
 
    Accordingly, had the substance of rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules been 
contained in the LRA, it would have been possible to argue that the provision 
is in conflict with PAJA and that the LRA would therefore not need to be read 
with PAJA. However, Tuchten J held that this was not the case and that rule 
25(1)(c) therefore needed to be consistent with PAJA, failing which a 
declaration of constitutional invalidity would ensue. 
 
6 Unfair  discrimination 
 
The Respondents raised various points in limine, the first one being that, to 
the extent that the challenge as to the constitutionality of rule 25(1)(c) was 
based on alleged unfair discrimination, the proper forum which the Law 
Society should have utilised is the Equality Court and not the High Court. 
    The Respondents contended that the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA) effectively 
deprived the High Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional challenges 
that were based on alleged unfair discrimination and that the Equality Court 
was the proper forum where such disputes were to be dealt with. 
    Referring to Monong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and 
Transport, Eastern Cape (2009 (6) SA 589 (SCA)), Tuchten J held that a 
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person who was a victim of discrimination was not precluded by PEPUDA 
from bringing proceedings in the ordinary course in a High Court. The 
Respondents contended that the conclusion in Monong was arrived at per 
incuriam and that the court was therefore not bound by it. Tuchten J 
disagreed with the Respondents and held that it would be “[m]ost 
obstructive, to put it mildly, to the due administration of justice if a 
constitutional challenge against a single action or complex of actions which 
involved… alleged infringements of the Bill of Rights … had to be decided in 
two separate hearings” (par 20). He further held that “[i]f the legislature 
intended to abridge the jurisdiction of High Courts in such a singular manner, 
it would’ve done so in the clearest of language” (par 20). 
    The Respondents, in the alternative, contended that the court had 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Equality Court to determine the application 
and that the court should exercise its discretion and decline jurisdiction in 
favour of the Equality Court. Tuchten J declined to do so for various reasons. 
The Respondents, firstly, did not make such an argument in the papers 
before the court. Furthermore, the procedure in the Equality Court required 
that an inquiry took place which would take a considerable amount of time. 
Also, where a litigant had chosen in good faith one out of two or more 
available forums for its constitutional challenge, such a choice should be 
respected. Tuchten J further held that, as a matter of policy, the High Court 
should “[j]ealously guard its position as the arbiter of first instance of 
constitutional matters and should not, where there is jurisdiction concurrent 
with a court of similar status, decline jurisdiction unless it has been plainly 
shown that such court of similar status is, by reason of its specialist 
character, better suited to determine the particular constitutional matter 
placed before it” (par 21). Tuchten J, as the fifth reason for declining 
jurisdiction in favour of the Equality Court, stated that he had, in any event, 
received the relevant training as contemplated by section 31(4) of PEPUDA. 
    The Respondents’ first point in limine was dismissed for the 
aforementioned reasons and the Respondents were, therefore, unsuccessful 
in proving that the Law Society should have utilised a different forum other 
than the court. 
 
7 Second  and  third  in  limine  points 
 
According to Tuchten J, the second and third in limine points go to the heart 
of the dispute and these points are therefore discussed as part of the merits 
of the challenge. The second and third in limine points raised by the 
Respondents effectively translate into the submission that rule 25(1)(c) of 
the Rules is permitted by section 115(2A)(k) of the LRA read together with 
section 3(3) of PAJA. 
    Section 3 of PAJA is titled “Procedurally fair administrative action affecting 
any person” and subsection (3) provides that: 
 
“In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an 
administrator may, in his or her or its discretion, also give a person referred to 
in subsection (1) [i.e. a person whose rights or legitimate expectations are 
materially and adversely affected by administrative action] an opportunity to – 
(a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation; 




(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and 
(c) appear in person.” 
 
    Rule 25(1)(c) restricts the right to representation by excluding legal 
practitioners (“legal practitioner” is defined in s 213 of the LRA to mean “any 
person admitted to practise as an advocate or attorney in the Republic”) 
from appearance unless the parties and the commissioner consent to the 
appearance of a legal practitioner or if the commissioner concludes that it is 
unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute without legal 
representation, after considering various factors. These factors include: (a) 
the nature of the questions of law raised by the dispute; (b) the complexity of 
the dispute; (c) the public interest; and (d) the comparative abilities of the 
parties to deal with the dispute. It is evident from the aforegoing that rule 
25(1)(c) fails to make provision for representation in “serious” cases. 
    The Law Society effectively contended that a reasonable or constitutional 
rationale was lacking as to why only practising legal practitioners had a 
qualified right to appear in dismissal disputes involving conduct or capacity. 
Tuchten J noted that rule 25(1)(c) did not affect the right conferred in rule 
25(1)(b) in relation to other categories of representatives – only legal 
practitioners as defined were hit by the impugned subrule. 
 
8 Legality  and  rationality 
 
Tuchten J stated that the principle of legality meant that the exercise of 
public power was only legitimate when lawful and that the principle of legality 
required inter alia that conduct in the exercise of public power had not to be 
arbitrary or irrational. Accordingly, the Rules, the framing of which in 
themselves was an administrative decision, had to be rational. If the decision 
was such that no reasonable person could have taken it, the decision would 
be set aside. In this regard, consideration had to inter alia be given to the 
reasons advanced to justify the decision. 
 
9 Reasons  for  exclusion  of  legal  practitioners 
 
In an attempt to justify the exclusion of legal practitioners from appearing in 
misconduct or incapacity disputes at the CCMA, the Respondents led 
evidence inter alia relating to the fact that the system within which the CCMA 
functioned was the product of a very particular social and legal context, 
negotiated by a variety of social partners and that the restrictions on legal 
representation were part of this context and the product of these 
negotiations. 
    The Respondents further alleged that it was inherent in the structure of 
adjudication of disputes by the CCMA that misconduct or incapacity disputes 
were less serious and that it should be adjudicated swiftly and with the 
minimum legal formalities. The Respondents specifically stated as follows: 
 
“disputes about whether individual[s] or groups of employees have breached 
company rules or are incapacitated to an extent that justifies their dismissal 
are less serious, are regulated by a detailed code of practice, and should be 
adjudicated swiftly and with the minimum of legal formalities” (par 28). 
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    According to the Respondents, the presence of lawyers at the CCMA-
arbitration process will result in delays, time-wasting and obfuscation of the 
real issues in dispute. In this regard, Tuchten J held that the solution 
employed by the High Courts is to try to staff courts with presiding officers 
who are equipped to deal properly with conduct of the nature referred to 
above and that, more often than not, the legal representatives contribute to 
the efficient and speedy resolution of disputes. Tuchten J accordingly found 
that there was no reason why this should not be the case in CCMA 
arbitrations as well. 
    Before dealing with the Respondents’ submissions regarding the 
constitutionality of rule 25(1)(c), Tuchten J stated that the views of the 
CCMA had to be accorded substantial weight and be treated with a degree 
of deference by the court as it lacked the specialist expertise of the Labour 
Court. However, Tuchten J nevertheless held that the loss by an employee 
of his or her job was a very serious matter and he therefore disagreed with 
the Respondents’ submission that the differentiation between dismissals on 
the basis of an employee’s conduct or capacity and other dismissals was 
justifiable in light of the less serious nature of the former types of dismissals. 
    Tuchten J further referred to the judgment of Netherburn Engineering CC 
t/a Netherburn Ceramics v Mudau (2009 (4) BLLR 299 (LAC)) in which Musi 
JA held that section 140(1) of the LRA was rational and where he found that 
the seriousness of arbitrations concerning dismissals for misconduct did not 
of itself justify legal representation. Tuchten J noted, however, that section 
3(3)(a) of PAJA did not apply in Netherburn Engineering CC as the LRA at 
that time dealt expressly with the question of legal representation – section 
140(1) of the LRA, which was effectively replaced by rule 25(1) of the Rules, 
provided that: 
 
“If the dispute being arbitrated is about the fairness of a dismissal and a party 
has alleged that the reason for the dismissal relates to the employee’s 
conduct or capacity, the parties…are not entitled to be represented by a legal 
practitioner in the arbitration proceedings unless (a) the commissioner and all 
the other parties consent; or (b) the commissioner concludes that it is 
unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute without legal 
representation, after considering– (i) the nature of the questions of law raised 
by the dispute; (ii) the complexity of the dispute; (iii) the public interest; and 
(iv) the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to 
deal with the arbitration of the dispute.” 
 
    Musi JA held that, in respect of misconduct and incapacity arbitrations, a 
CCMA commissioner had a discretion at the commencement of proceedings 
to decide whether to allow legal representation. However, according to 
Tuchten J it often happened that a matter which appeared to be simple and 
straightforward at the commencement of proceedings turned out to be more 
complex than originally anticipated. The differentiation between dismissals 
based on misconduct or incapacity and other forms of dismissal could not 
therefore, according to Tuchten J, be justified on this basis. 
    Musi JA further held that it was rational to distinguish between dismissals 
based on misconduct and incapacity and other unfair dismissals as the 
former constitute by far the bulk of the disputes arbitrated by the CCMA. 
Tuchten J disagreed and held that it was arbitrary to categorize one case for 









Tuchten J found that, taking into account that PAJA was enacted to give 
effect to section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(s 33 is titled “Just administrative action” and it inter alia provided that 
“everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair”), rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules was inconsistent with section 
3(3) of PAJA. It was held that this was the case in so far as a commissioner 
dealing with a misconduct or incapacity dispute at the CCMA did not retain a 
discretion to allow legal representation in serious cases. Section 3(3) 
afforded an administrator a discretion to permit legal representation in 
serious or complex cases; however, rule 25(1)(c) did not permit a CCMA 
commissioner to take the seriousness of the dismissal dispute into account. 
Tuchten J held that the rule “[i]mpermissibly trenches upon the discretion 
conferred by s 3(3)(a) of PAJA in relation to serious cases” (par 39). 
    The Respondents submitted that a change to the current regime would 
significantly add to the workload of the CCMA and thus impair its ability to 
perform its core functions. Tuchten J refused to take this into account as a 
matter of principle and referred to Sidumo in which it was held that: 
 
“Employees are entitled to assert their rights. If by so doing a greater volume 
of work is generated for the CCMA, then the State is obliged to provide the 
means to ensure that constitutional and labour law rights are protected and 
vindicated” (par 77). 
 
    Tuchten J held that the Respondents failed to establish that the limitation 
of the right to legal representation imposed under rule 25(1)(c) was 
reasonable and justifiable and he accordingly found rule 25(1)(c) of the 




The declaration of constitutional invalidity of rule 25(1)(c) was suspended for 
36 months to enable the relevant parties to consider and promulgate a new 
subrule. It effectively meant that the limitation of the right to legal 
representation in circumstances where the dismissal related to the 
employee’s conduct or capacity remained until such time as a new subrule is 
promulgated. However, as is evinced by the award of commissioner Jansen 
van Vuuren in Khunoa v Africa Security Solutions Gauteng (Pty) Ltd (2013 
(4) BALR 397 (CCMA)), there appeared to be some confusion as to the 
status of rule 25(1)(c) following the finding of Tuchten J. In Khunoa (supra), 
the applicant-employee had been dismissed on the basis of alleged 
misconduct. He requested permission to be legally represented at the 
arbitration. The request was not made in the form of an application in terms 
of rule 25(1) of the Rules; he merely referred the commissioner to the 
judgment of Tuchten J in Law Society of the Northern Provinces (supra). The 
commissioner, after having considered the judgment of Tuchten J, stated 
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that “It is, with respect, difficult to reconcile the court’s order with its view that 
section 3(3)(a) of PAJA can only be ousted by the Labour Relations Act itself 
and not by any CCMA Rule to be promulgated” (par 22). In this regard, the 
commissioner found that: 
 
“The suspension of the Court’s declaration of constitutional invalidity simply 
means that rule 25(1)(c) is not deemed to be unconstitutional for now, but it 
does raise a question about the rule’s current status. It is, after all, 
inconsistent with section 3(3)(a) of PAJA and the question is consequently 
whether the issue of legal representation should not, in any event, be dealt 
with in terms of that section. A Commissioner who conducts a CCMA 
arbitration does perform an administrative function and the absence of any 
provisions in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 itself implies that the 
relevant provisions of PAJA should be complied with. A CCMA Rule can, after 
all not ‘oust’ PAJA …The question is whether a CCMA Commissioner who 
exercises his discretion should consider the factors enumerated in CCMA rule 
25(1)(c) or those mentioned in section 3(3) of PAJA” (par 24, 25 and 26). 
 
    In deciding which approach to follow, the commissioner compared section 
3(3) of PAJA to rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules and held that: 
 
“Tuchten J, at paragraph 39, pointed out that rule 25(1)(c) differed from 
section 3(3) of PAJA in that it did not confer a discretion in a serious but not 
complex case of dismissal for misconduct or incapacity. The learned Judge 
also stated that the said rule impermissibly ‘trenched’ upon the discretion 
conferred by section 3(3)(a) of PAJA in relation to serious cases. There are 
also other differences. PAJA makes no mention of the nature of the questions 
of law, the comparative ability of the parties or public interest. These are 
important considerations in the context of unfair dismissal arbitrations at the 
CCMA, but they presumably also abridge a Commissioner’s discretion. The 
application in casu will consequently be considered in accordance with the 
provisions of section 3(3)(a) of PAJA instead of CCMA rule 25(1)(c)” (pars 28, 
29 and 30). 
 
    However, apart from the questionable application of PAJA to CCMA 
proceedings in the abovementioned context, in Khunoa (supra) the 
commissioner failed to appreciate that the effect of suspending an order of 
invalidity was that the legislation, in this case rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules, for 
the period of suspension, remained of full force and effect (Currie and De 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 210). In Executive Council of 
the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa (1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC)), the Constitutional Court, in 
relation to the suspension of orders of invalidity, stated as follows: 
 
“Section 98(5) [of the interim Constitution; cf s 172(1)(b)(ii) of the 1996 
Constitution] permits this Court to put Parliament on terms to correct the 
defect in an invalid law within a prescribed time. If exercised, this power has 
the effect of making the declaration of invalidity subject to a resolutive 
condition. If the matter is rectified, the declaration falls away and what was 
done in terms of the law is given validity. If not, the declaration of invalidity 
takes place at the expiry of the prescribed period, and the normal 
consequences attaching to such a declaration ensure” (par 106). 
 
    Accordingly, the fact that rule 25(1)(c) was declared unconstitutional did 
not mean that commissioners were empowered to follow section 3(3) of 
PAJA to permit legal representation in serious and complex cases. The 
declaration of constitutional invalidity of rule 25(1)(c) was suspended for 36 
months to enable the relevant parties to consider and promulgate a new 




subrule. In other words, in contradistinction to the approach followed in 
Khunoa (supra), rule 25(1)(c) of the Rules continued to apply in the interim. 
    Furthermore, in finding that rule 25(1)(c) does not confer a discretion on a 
commissioner to allow legal representation in serious cases which are not 
necessarily also complex and that this is contrary to the provisions of section 
3(3) of PAJA and section 33 of the Constitution, Tuchten J held as follows: 
 
“The impugned subrule does not, as does s 3(3)(a) of PAJA, confer the 
discretion in a serious case which is not also a complex case. PAJA was 
enacted to give effect to s 33 of the Bill of Rights. The impugned subrule is in 
my view inconsistent with s 33 to the extent that it significantly abridges the 
discretion of the commissioner in a CCMA arbitration to afford the opportunity 
for legal representation in a serious but not complex case of dismissal for 
misconduct or incapacity. The impugned subrule also impermissibly trenches 
upon the discretion conferred by s 3(3)(a) of PAJA in relation to serious 
cases” (par 39). 
 
    According to Tuchten J, had rule 25(1)(c) conferred a discretion on a 
commissioner to allow legal representation in serious cases which are not 
complex, the rule would not have been inconsistent with section 3(3) of 
PAJA and section 33 of the Constitution. In other words, should the rule 
have been amended to make provision for legal representation in serious 
cases, the effect of Tuchten J’s finding would be that it remains permissible 
for rule 25(1)(c) to restrict the right to representation by excluding legal 
practitioners from appearance as of right unless the nature of the case is 
such as to persuade the commissioner that the appearance of a legal 
practitioner is warranted or all parties and the commissioner consent to the 
appearance of the legal practitioner. 
    The Applicants had attacked the rationale behind the qualified right of 
practising legal practitioners to appear in dismissal disputes involving 
conduct or capacity; however, an amendment of the rule to provide for legal 
representation in serious cases would in any event mean that there is still no 
absolute right to legal representation – a CCMA commissioner retains a 
discretion to permit or refuse legal representation in misconduct or 
incapacity disputes on the basis of inter alia the seriousness of the dispute. 
This view is reinforced by the concluding remarks of Tuchten J that the 
finding of constitutional invalidity does not mean that there must be an 
unrestricted right to legal representation. On the contrary, Tuchten J held 
that the common law and section 3(3) of PAJA conferred a discretion to 
permit legal representation. In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon 
Internal Disciplinary Committee (2002 (5) SA 449 (SCA)), the Supreme 
Court of Appeal reaffirmed that at common law there was no entitlement as 
of right to legal representation in proceedings before statutory bodies and 
other tribunals and that the Constitution had not abrogated the common-law 
position.  In terms of PAJA, the presiding officer must consider on a case-by-
case basis whether a person whose rights or legitimate expectations are 
materially or adversely affected by administrative action, should be given the 
opportunity to obtain legal representation. In particular, presiding officers 
under PAJA must take into account not only the complexity of the matter, but 
also the seriousness. 
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    Even if rule 25(1)(c) had been amended to bring it in line with section 3(3) 
of PAJA by incorporating into the rule the seriousness of the dispute as a 
factor in determining whether to permit or refuse legal representation in 
conduct or capacity disputes, the limitation of the general right of 
appearance of legal practitioners in conduct or capacity disputes would 
continue to apply. The finding of Tuchten J would therefore effectively result 
in an eventual broadening of the scope of the considerations currently 
operative under rule 25(1)(c) – the pertinent question then becomes to what 
extent it would be “unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation” given the “seriousness” of the dispute. It is 
uncertain on what basis a commissioner would ever be able to refuse legal 
representation where an employee has alleged that the matter was serious. 
In relation to the seriousness of an employee’s dismissal, Tuchten J held as 
follows: 
 
“But I cannot agree that a dismissal of an employee is never a serious matter 
− for the employee. In a great number of cases, the employee's job will be his 
major asset. The loss of your major asset is a serious matter. Whether the 
dismissal is a serious matter for the employer is a different question, 
particularly where the job done by the allegedly offending employee is a 
humble one, in respect of which the supply of job seekers exceeds the 
demand of potential employers” (par 30). 
 
    It is difficult to conceive of many instances, if any, where the dismissal of 
an employee is not a serious matter. And even where the seriousness of the 
dispute (from an employee’s perspective) is indeed questionable, one would 
imagine that, from a practice perspective, CCMA commissioners would tend 
to venture on the side of caution and permit legal representation rather than 
running the risk of rendering a reviewable award on the basis that legal 
representation had been refused as the employee’s dismissal was not 
“serious” enough to warrant legal representation. Further adding to the 
uncertainty was the fact that Tuchten J failed to address the issue of the 
countervailing submissions of the parties to a dispute on the seriousness of 
the dispute by stating that “whether the Constitution and applicable 
legislation permit a differentiation in relation to legal representation at CCMA 
arbitrations where the dispute is serious for the one party and less than 
serious for the other, is outside the scope of the dispute before me and, 
therefore, this judgment” (par 30). 
    The considerations that are generally taken into account in determining, in 
terms of PAJA, whether a case is “serious or complex”, were referred to in 
Schoon v MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, 
Northern Province (2003 (9) BLLR 963 (T)), where it was held that: 
 
“In order to determine whether a case is a ‘serious or complex’ one, regard 
should be had to such factors as the nature of the charges brought, the 
degree of factual or legal complexity attendant upon considering them, the 
potential suitably qualified lawyers, the seriousness of consequences of an 
adverse finding, the availability of the persons who may well represent the 
applicant, the fact that there is a legally trained person presenting the case 
against the applicant, and any other fact relevant to the fairness or otherwise 
of confining the applicant to the kind of representation for which the 
representation rule expressly provides. These are pertinent factors” (par 27). 
 




    The factors referred to in the Schoon case (supra) in determining whether 
a case was “serious or complex” encapsulated those considerations 
enumerated in rule 25(1)(c) as well as other considerations not listed in the 
rule. It was also not a closed list of factors. Ostensibly, an amendment to 
rule 25(1)(c) could not, in any event, entail simply inserting into the rule a 
reference to “serious and complex” cases – the rule in its entirety would 
need to be reformed to bring it in line with section 3(3) of PAJA and those 
considerations that inform the meaning of the factors expressly listed 
therein. 
    Should rule 25(1)(c) have been amended by simply incorporating a 
reference to “serious and complex” cases, the legislature would effectively 
be conferring on CCMA commissioners the unenviable task of establishing 
the confines of “seriousness” as a ground for deciding whether to permit or 
refuse legal representation. And, in the absence of any constraints placed on 
the meaning of “serious” in rule 25(1)(c), the discretion afforded in rule 
25(1)(c) to a commissioner would be rendered superfluous and the right to 
legal representation in conduct or capacity dispute would, effectively, be 
absolute. Such an approach to amending the rule would also have 
contradicted the general position that there was no entitlement as of right to 





The CCMA appealed the decision handed down by Tuchten J in Law Society 
of the Northern Provinces case (supra). The decision of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal is reported at CCMA v Law Society, Northern Provinces (2013 
(11) BLLR 1057 (SCA)). The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the 
judgment in Law Society of the Northern Provinces case (supra) and ruled 
that rule 25(1)(c) was not irrational nor did it constitute an infringement of 
any party’s constitutional rights. 
    The court in CCMA (supra) examined the historical development of the 
labour dispensation as codified in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and 
the compromises reached by NEDLAC in the process. The court held that 
the bulk of cases referred to the CCMA concern unfair dismissals for 
incapacity and misconduct and that the legislature had identified these as 
categories where legal representation might correctly be excluded. In this 
regard, the court held, inter alia, as follows: 
 
“The fact that the subrule distinguishes between different kinds of cases does 
not per se render the rule irrational. The history of the subrule and the nature 
of the historical compromise reached show that the bulk of cases referred to 
the CCMA involve unfair dismissals for incapacity and misconduct. The 
Legislature identified these matters as the appropriate category where the 
policy considerations underlying the need to exclude legal representation 
should find application. The courts cannot interfere with rational decisions that 
have been made lawfully on the ground that they consider a different decision 
preferable. The judge in the court below disregarded the considered judgment 
of experts who first drafted the LRA; the social partners at NEDLAC who 
endorsed their views on the proper approach to legal representation before 
the CCMA and the extensive experience of the CCMA and labour courts that 
404 OBITER 2014 
 
 
an automatic right to legal representation in these cases was inconsistent with 
the aim of expeditious and inexpensive resolution of these disputes. He did so 
without any evidence to support his own views” (par 22). 
 
    The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that Tuchten J had failed to 
consider a commissioner’s wide-ranging discretion to allow legal 
representation in certain circumstances. The court stated that a request for 
legal representation might be made at any time of arbitration proceedings 
and the commissioner was allowed considerable latitude in permitting legal 
representation. The court also commented on the seriousness of the 
individual consequences of the dismissal: 
 
“It may be allowed where the commissioner and all the parties agree. In 
addition, the commissioner may allow it in exercising his or her discretion 
when he or she considers that it is ‘unreasonable to expect a party to deal 
with the dispute without legal representation’ after consideration of the listed 
factors … These factors may well, in a given case, include the seriousness of 
the individual consequences of a dismissal, assuming that this is not already 
encompassed by the subrule, which I doubt” (par 21). 
 
    The most concerning issue addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
was the finding by Tuchten J that section 3(3)(a) of PAJA applied to CCMA 
proceedings. According to the court, although CCMA proceedings amounted 
to administrative action, it did not mean that administrative action was 
regulated solely by PAJA. The LRA might also provide for the conduct of 
specialised administrative proceedings within its area of application. The 
court held that the LRA had equally created a “separate regime … for the fair 
conduct of arbitrations by the CCMA” (par 20). PAJA could not therefore 
override the provisions of the LRA, including rule 25(1)(c). Accordingly, the 
rules drawn up by the CCMA in terms of the LRA superseded competing 
provisions in other legislation. The court held as follows in this regard: 
 
“Tuchten J found that rule 25(1)(1)(c) was inconsistent with s 3(3)(a) of PAJA 
because the subrule did not confer a discretion in a serious case which was 
not also complex. I do not think that PAJA applies to the procedures adopted 
by CCMA arbitrators. Neither s 33 of the Constitution nor PAJA precludes 
specialised legislative regulation of administrative action alongside general 
legislation such as PAJA. However, such specialised regulation must comply 
and be consistent with s 33. PAJA, as I have said, does not apply to the 
review of CCMA arbitrations. The LRA sets out in specific terms in ss 138 and 
142 how CCNA (sic) arbitrations are to be conducted. The reasoning that the 
the Constitutional Court (sic) in Sidumo to hold that the LRA created a self-
contained regime for reviews equally applies to the separate regime it created 
in those sections for the fair conduct of arbitrations by the CCMA. PAJA was 
accordingly inapplicable in this case.” 
 
    For inter alia the reasons referred to above, the appeal was upheld and 
the application was dismissed with costs including the costs of two counsel. 
The Constitutional Court has subsequently refused the Law Society of the 
Northern Provinces leave to appeal to decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal with costs on the basis that such an appeal bore no prospects of 
success. 
 






The LRA seeks to establish a labour-law dispensation premised partly on 
economy of costs and economy of scale, thereby enabling the speedy and 
efficient resolution of disputes adjudicated by the CCMA, and doing so in a 
fair manner. It is in view of the aforegoing that the judgment of the SCA was 
well received; particularly in so far as the interests of the parties themselves 
to disputes at the CCMA are concerned. Excessive legalism will generally 
not serve the interests of parties to disputes that are subject to CCMA-
arbitration proceedings; it may, however, serve the interests of the attorney 
profession, the latter interests not being the primary concern of the new 
labour dispensation. The court in CCMA (supra) stated that: 
 
“A right to legal representation exists for the benefit and protection of litigants. 
In this case the Law Society does not purport to be pursuing the interests of 
those who use the services of the CCMA. Indeed, there is not the slightest 
suggestion in its papers that the restriction on the right to legal representation 
causes hardship to or has operated to the prejudice of those affected by it 
…The sole concern of the Law Society in bringing this litigation is that the 
subrule denies work to its members. Nothing in the Constitution nor any 
decided cases suggests that lawyers have a right to received business. 
Where they receive business through the operation of the courts or other 
tribunals that is because their clients have a right to employ their services and 
not because they have a right to provide them.” 
 
    This does not mean that parties are not entitled to be legally represented 
in incapacity and misconduct disputes, nor does it mean that legal 
representatives are themselves not entitled to appear at these proceedings. 
It simply means that, in order to be legally represented, the commissioner 
and the parties would need to consent, or the commissioner would need to 
conclude that it is unreasonable to expect a party to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation after considering the nature of the questions of 
law raised by the dispute, the complexity of the dispute, the public interest 
and the comparative ability of the parties or their representatives to deal with 
the dispute. And, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, it is likely that 
the aforementioned factors include the seriousness of the consequence(s) of 
the dismissal. In other words, where the misconduct or incapacity of dispute 
is of such a nature that legal representation is warranted in the 
circumstances, there should be no reason why in such circumstances a 
party to the dispute should be prejudiced by not permitting him or her to be 
legally represented. 
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